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Introduction 
When China resumed sovereignty nver Hong Kong on  July 1, 1997, Hong Kong's 
rconomy w3s strong, the stock and propcrty markets were high, and the general 
consensus was that the economy would continue t o  prosper. But the general 
consensus proved egregiously wrong. In  the sccor~d half of 1997, an economic 
crisis began to  engulf Asia and Hong Kong. Regional currencies collapsed, 
speculators attacked the Hong  Kong dollar, local stock and property prices 
plummeted, and Hong Kong slid into recession. 
Some recent statistics help to  put the current economic problenls into 
perspective. The IIong Kong GDP declined 5.1 per cent in 1998 from the 1997 
levels, having experienced negative growth in each quarter of rhe year.' The 6.9 
per cent decline in the Hong Kong economy in the third quarter of 1998 was the 
"worst on  rccord"' and was followcd by a 5.7 per cent decline in the fourrh 
quarter. A l t h ~ u ~ h  the GDP continued to  shrink by 3.4 per cent in the first quarter 
of 1999, the amount of the decline was an i~nprovernent over the final two 
quarters of 1998 and slightly better than thc go\.crunlent hdd iorecasr.' However, 
unemploymenr continues to  rise and recently increased from a seasonally adjusted 
level of 5.7 per cent in the final quarter of 1998 ro 6.2 per cent in the first quarter 
ot 1999, both of which are all-time, post-war highs? 
Earlier version? of rhese article were prescntcd at the Acddemics' hleeting a t  the 
INSOL Yac16c '99 Conferencr, Auckland, New Zealand, on February 21, 1959, and at thc 
American Bar Association Section of Business Law Spring hleeting, San L'rancisco, CA, on 
April 16, 1979. 
' Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Annual Reporr 1998, p. 3 (Chief Execlttive's Srare- 
rnenrj (lYY8). 
'Jake Lloyd-Smith, "Strategists look ahcad with cautious optimism", 5. China Morning 
P o t  (hlarkrrs Post), January 2, 1YY7, p. 16. 
' "Hang Kong GDP Contracted 3.4% in First Qudrter", Artan Wall Street 1.. June 22, 
1977, p. 3. 
'See l~tt~://www.inIo.~uv,hUhkri-onlreIease, Ptess Release, May 28, 1979, "Hong Kong 
Economy: Economic situation in thp first qulrrer of 1999: The labour market". 
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The H o n g  Kong property market also fell dramatically-almost 50 per cent 
from its peak 1997 levels5-before recently rebounding ~ l i g h t l y . ~  This collapse has 
put  pressure o n  both individual home-owners and corporate buyers. Home- 
owners are desperately trying to  make their mortgage payments and, surprisingly, 
arc proving successful; the default rate remains low (only 0.84 per cent7). But the 
financial hardship on hnme-owners has led t o  a dramatic decrease in consumer 
spending. Retail monthly sales in late 1998 were 16 per cent lower than their 1997 
counterparts, and the first quarter results for 1999 sllow a further 10 per cent 
decline.' O n  the corporate front, many Hong Kong companies invested heavily in 
property when the market was rising-at times, through the misuse of trade 
finance loans.' Many companies are now finding it difficult to  pay back these 
loans. Such problems, as well as general difficulties in corporate Icnding, caused 
H o n g  Kong banks' had debts to  triple in 1998 and to  reach their highest levels in 
over a decade." These levels arc cxpected to  increase even further, especially in the 
light of the heavy exposure of many banks to  companies in mainland China that 
have recently been declared bankrupt o r  are in serious financial difficulties." And 
lastly, after a dramatic fall, the Hang Seng stock index has heen recnvering. As of 
early July 1999, the Hang Seng has risen more than 20 per cent from the October 
1997 level at which it stood when the Asian crisis hit H o n g  Kong, and more than 
110 per cent from the lowest l e ~ e l s  of the crisis in August 1998 before the  
government's massive intervention in the H o n g  Kong stock market." Overall, 
' rbid.  "Hong Kong Economy: Economic situation in the first quarter of 1999: The 
property market." In addition, the value of property transactions in 1998 fell 61% from their 
1997 levels. Sandy 1.i. "Property sales value plummcb 61pc as economic crisis hits", S. China 
Morning Port (Business Post), January 4, 1999, p. 1 (citing estate agent Chi Cheung 
Property). 
6% according to government rsrimates. See n. 4, above, at "Hong Kong Economy: 
Economic situation in the lirst quarter uf 1999: The property market'. Even at these lower 
levels, Hong Kong property is still among the most expcnsive in the world. Cheah Cheng 
Hyc, "Once uarlul currrucy peg now seen as SAR ohst.~cle", S. China Morning Port 
(Business Post), February 10, 1999, p. 6. 
S e e  "Hong Kong Sees Grow,ing Market For Mortgages", Asian Wall Street].,  Fcbruary 
9, 1994, p. 26. 
'See n. 4, above, at "Ilong Kong Economy: Economic situation in thc first quartrr of 
1999: Domestic demand". 
Statement of Uavid Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kung hlunetary 
A~~thoriry [the "H.K.M.A."], quoted in Enoch Yiu, "Bad debts soar as mainland woes 
sscalate", S. Chrna Mornirig Port (Business Post), January 16, 1999, p. 1. 
'O ihid. 
" ibid. For exa~nplc, in January 1999, Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Corp. [GITIC] was declared bankrupt, and serious problems also surfaced at Grlangdong 
Enrerprises (kloldings). flowever: given the strength of local hanks bcforc the crisis, no 
hanks appear to be in any immed~ate financial danger. 
"See I'l~ilip Segal, "Asian Tigers Clati B a c k ,  International Herald Trib., July 8 ,  1999, at 
1 ;  Cathy Holcombe, Barry Porter & William Barnes, "Brokers await rally rewards", S. 
China Morning Port (Business Post), July 9, 1999, p. 1. For a discussion of the 
government's intervention in thc lucal stock market, see Katherine Lynch, "The temptation 
to intervene: problems created by government intervention in the Hong Kong stock 
mlrket", 29 Hong Kung L.J. 123 (1999). In June 1999, the Hong Kong government 
announced its intention to sell off most of its portfolio, which has grown in value by more 
Charles D. Booth 
these statistics may signal a bottom t o  the current problems in Hong Kong-- 
although commentators are divided-and one investment house named 1999  he 
"Year of Confidence Restoration"." 
'The economic crisis has led to a sharp incrcasc in the number of insolvencies in 
Hong Kong." It has also increased the awareness of the role that insolvency law 
can play in facilitating economic recovery. This article discusses insolvency law 
reform in Hong Kong, focusing on bankruptcy law and corporate rescue. Part 1 
provides background information, including a brief description of the financial 
and credit and security structure in Hong Kong, an overview of Hong Kong 
insolvency law and insolvency statistics, and a summary of the Hong Kong 
insolvency law reform process. Part 11 identifies trcnds in the new bankruptcy 
resulting from the enactment of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 1996 
(the "B.A.0."),'5 and discusses many of the recently enacted provisions. Part 111 
dcscribes the existing procedures for corporate rcscuc in Hong Kong and then 
considers the proposals of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (the 
"Law Reform Commission") for improving the corporate rehabilitation 
process. 
I. Background Information 
Financial and Credit and Security Structure 
Hong Kong is one of the world's financial centrcs with the second largest stock 
market in Asia, a vibrant banking sector, an active foreign exchange market, 
growing derivatives and debt markets, and one of the world's largest gold bullion 
mdrkets." I n  1994 the U.S. government rated Hong  Kong "as one of the most 
open, transparent and fair markets in which to conduct banking business in 
Asia".17 
Companies in Hong Kong raise capital eithcr through issuing shares or, more 
commonly, by borrowing money. The mechanisms most frequently relied upon 
by banks lending to companies in I Iong Kong are mortgages over land, fixcd and 
float~ng charges, and guarantees. 'l'hc difference between a fixed and a floating 
charge may be sun~rnarised as follows: whereas a fixed charge "attaches" to 
"ascertained and definite" property (such as machinery), a floating charge 
than U.S.Sl0 billion. Mark Landler, "Hong Kong Ready to Sell $26 Billion In Blue Chips", 
Irzterrratiunal Herald Trib. (Business/l:inance), June 22, 1999. a1 13. 
" Lloyd-Smith, n.  2, above. 
" See Irrrolvcn~~ Statistics in Part 1, accompanyi~lg nn. 35-39, below. 
"The Hong Kong Bankruptcy (Amendmcnr) Ordinance 1996, Ordinance No. 76 of 1996 
[hereinafter the B.A.O.]. 
l 6  http://www.info.gov.hk/fsb/fs/content.htm, Hong Kong Financial Services Rurrnu, 
F a n  Sheer orr hnancial Sewices (July 3, 1999). 
" U.S. Government National 'Treatment Study (1991). 
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"hovers" over a changing class of assets (such as inventory).18 A noted comment- 
ator describes the underlying notion of a floating charge as follows: 
that of a class of revolving assets which the company is t o  be free t o  manage 
and deal with in the ordinary course of business until an event occurs which 
entitles the creditor to intervene and assert his security rights over the asscts 
then held o r  subsequently acquired by the ~ o r n p a n y . ' ~  
Typically, a corporate loan will be made subject to a debenture. A debenture will 
typically provide a bank with a fixed charge over certain specified assets and/or a 
floating charge over the "undertaking" o r  "undertaking and property" of a 
company. The debenture will further provide that, upon a specified event of 
default, the lender will be entitled t o  appoint a receiver to take control of the 
charged assets and, in the case of a floating charge over the undertaking (or 
undertaking arid property) of a company, to carry o n  the business of the company. 
Other  methods of protection available to creditors include liens, pledges o r  
hypothecations, retention of title, and set-off. 
Insolvency Law 
The insolvency of individuals is regulated by the Hong  Kong Bankruptcy 
Ordinance (the "Bankruptcy O r d i n a n ~ e " ) , ~ ~ w h i c h ,  until recently amended by the 
B.A.O.," was based on English legislation dating back to the 1880s. The  
insolvency of companics is regulated by Parts VZ2 and X2' of the Hong Kong 
Contpanies Ordinance (the "Companies Ord inan~e") , '~  which, in many respects, 
is still based on the United Kingdom Companies Act 1929." 
ls INingu:orth v. Houldsworth [I9041 A.C. 355, 358. The Hong Kong Con~ydrlies 
Ordinance (cap. 32), The Laws of Hong Kong [hereinafter L.H.K.] (1999) [hereinafter the 
Cornparlies Ordinance] does not define "floating charge". 
'' Roy Goode, ComrnnciLzl Law, 732 (2nd ed., 1995). 
' O  Cap. 6,  L.H.K. (1999) [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Ordinance]. 
2'See n. 15, above. 
2 2  For "registered" companies, i e .  companies "formed and registered" under Pan I of the 
Companies Ordinance. 
" For "unregistered" companies, which, for the most part, are foreign companies and 
include ovcrsea companies registered under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance. For a 
discussion of the issues involving the insolvency of foreign companies in Hong Kong, see 
Charles D. Booth, "The Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong Insolvency Law", 2 
Southwestern J.L. dc Trade in rhe Americas 1 (1995); Charles D. Booth, "Living in Uncertain 
Times: The Necd to Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Insolvency Law", Colum 1. 
I'ransnat'l L. 38'1. 
" Cap. 32, L.H.K. (1999). 
'' United Kinedom Comnanies Act. 1929. I9 & 20 Geo. 5. ch. 23. Maior amendments - - -  , 
were made to H& Kong cAmpanies law in i984, many of which were basdd on the United 
Kingdom Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 ,  ch. 38, but little change was made to the 
liquidation provisions. l'he insolvency of partnerships is more complicated. A partnership 
carrying on husiness in Hong Kong may be subject to bankruptcy proceedings under s.7(1) 
of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. In addition, a Hong Kong partnership with eight or more 
panners or a foreign partnership may also be wound up under Part X of the Companies 
Ordinance as a n  "unregistered company". See Companies Ordinancc, s.326. 
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Although the decisions of most English courts were not strictly binding o n  
Hong Kong courts prior to July 1, 1997, where legislation enacted in Hong Kong 
in substance had been copied from English provisions it was rare for the Hong 
Kong courts to adopt a different position from that taken in England.2b This trcnd 
is most likely to continuc after thc handover of I Iong Kong to mainland China. 
Article 8 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adrni~~istrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China (the "Basic Law"),27 which is now the mini- 
constitution of the Hong Kong SAR, provides that the laws previously in force in 
Hong Kong (including the cnmrnon law and the rules of equity) shall be 
maintained unless they contravene the Basic Law o r  arc amended by the Hong  
Kong SAR legislature. Furthermore, Article 84 of the Basic Law provides that the 
courts of the Hong Knng SAR "rrlay refer to precedents of other common law 
jurisdicti~ns".'~ 
In Hong Kong a liquidation of a company is also callcd a "winding-up". A 
company may be wound up through either a voluntary winding-up (a winding-up 
without a court urder)" o r  a compulsory wi~iding-up (a winding-up by the 
c o ~ r t ) . ' ~  The Official Receiver is the governmcnt official who is involved in 
insolvencies in a variety of ways. The Official Receiver's Office blissinn Sta~ement 
is as follows: 
To provide an effective insolvency service to creditors and the puhlic by 
promoting high standards of insolvency administration when the Official 
Receiver is appointed to act as a trustee o r  as liquidator and by monitoring 
the conduct of private practitioner compulsory liquidators, to investigate the 
causes of business failure, to prosecute persons for insolvency offencca and to 
apply in appropriate cases for thc disqualification of company dire st or^.^^ 
One  nf r l ~ e  prirrrary failings of Hong Kong's corporate insolvency legislation is 
the lack of an effective procedure for- restructuring insolvent companies. The 
Companies Ordinance does include a provision for the negotiation of a scheme of 
arrangement o r  ~ornposi t ion. '~  but the mechanism is cumbersomc and rarely 
"See Prier \Vesley-Sniitll, An Introdurtron to rhe Ilotig Kong Legal System 72-73 (2nd 
ed.. 1993). . , 
"Basic Lair. ul the Hong Kong Sprcidl Admiilistntive Region of rhe People's Republic 
of China, ch. I ,  art. 8 [hereinafter the Rasic Law], rcprintcd in Public Law and Human 
Rights--A Hong Kung Sourcebuok 85 (Andrew Byrnes 8( Johannes Chan eds., 1993) 
[hueinafter Public 1 . d ~  and Human Rights]. 
'Wasic Law, c l~ .  4, s.4, art. 84, reprinted in Pabirr L'iror and  Human Rights, n. 27, abovc, 
ar 99. 
"See Companies Ordinance, ss.228-296. There are two types of voluntary winding-ups: 
P members' voluntary winding-up (for solvcnt cornplnirs), ss.234-239A, and a creditors' 
voluntary winding-up, ss.240-248. 
"ss .1  j 6 - 2 2 7 ~ ,  26i-296. 
" OJfi&i Receiver's Office, Annudl Departmental Report 1997-1998 (1998), Annex 2 
lhcrcinattcr Official Receiveri Ofhcc 1997-98 L)e~artmenral R~norrl. ,, '' See Companies Ordinance. . I h h .  
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used?' Given the absence of an effective statutory reorganisation prt~cedure, 
creditors at times attempt to  rehabilitate a company through either receivership o r  
out-of-court restructuring. In  a multib~nk-lending situation, the hanks follow the 
Gurdclines on Corporzte Difficultzes rssued by the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks (the ''H.K.A.B.").'4 These procedures are helpful, but d o  not diminish the 
need for an effective formal corporate rescue procedure. 
Insolvency Statistics 
Historically, H o n g  Kong has had a low rate of insolvency, both in absolute terms 
and as compared t o  the rates in other j~risdictions.'~ This low rate is in part duc 
to  the limitations of the insolvency procedures and the lack of incentives for its 
use by either creditors or   debtor^.)^ Over  the last 10 years the number of receiving 
orders (or bankruptcy orders since April 1, 1998)" in bankruptcy cases and 
compulsory winding-up orders in corporate liquidations has been as  follow^'^: 
Ycar (April 1-M.~rch 31) Receiving or bankruptcy I Winding-up orders orders 
"For further discussion of these problems, scc Charles D. Booth, "Hong Kong corporate 
rescue ~ro~osals-rnakine secured creditors more secure". 14(4) Insolvrncv L. 81 Prac. 248. . . ,  
249 (16983 [hereinafter '%ong Kong corporate rescue proposals"] (a~so'~ublished at 28 
Hong Kong I..J. 44 (1998)). 
"Hone Kone Association of Banks. Guidelines on Cornorate Difficulties (Circular No. ~ ~ 
3, 
S / S S / O ~ ~ ~ ( A ~ ~ $  1998). 
'5Cornparative data is not readily available, bur for the three-year period from 
19861989, the annual corporate rate in IIong Kong averaged 0.97%, in comparison to a 
2.27% rate in the United Kingdom. E. L. G. Tylcr, "Current Issues in Insolvency", in 
Commercial Law 20 (Caroline Hague, ed., 1991). 
36 For other relevant factors, see Charles D. Booth, "Recent Developments in Hong Kong 
Bankruptcy Law Refonn", 2 International Insolvency Review 120, 122-123 (1993). 
"Receiving orders were made in cases cornmcnced prior to April 1,199R and bankruptcy 
orders after that date. I'or a discussion of these orders, see the text accornpa~lying nn. 64-65, 
below. 
" Ofinal Receiver3 Ofice 1197-98 Departmentirl Report, n. 31, above, Annex 6 for data 
up to March 31.1998 and http:/lw-uw.info.govY1~k1orolshock-e.htrn [hereinafter the Ofticial 
Receiver's Offict. N'ebsite] for data after rhat date. 
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The recent online figures of the Official Receiver's office show a dramatic increase 
in the number of both bankruptcy and winding-up orders. For example, in the 
first two months of the 1999/00 reporting year, the total of 327 bankruptcy orders 
already exceeds the annual total for the number of receiving orders in each year 
f rom 1988/8Y to  19Y4/95. Si~nilarly, the two-month total of 169 winding-up 
orders for April-May 1999 cxcecds the total number of winding-up orders made 
in 1988/89.39 
Insolvency Law Reform Process 
During the run-up to July 1, 1997, there was a flurry of legislative activity and law 
refor111 efforts, and insolvcr~cy law was no exception. In  September 1990 the Law 
Reforrn Commission appointed a Sub-Corn~nitter o n  Insolvency (under the 
Chairmanship of I'rofcssor E. I.. G. Tyler) t o  conduct a review of bankruptcy and 
liquidation law and practice in Hong  Kong. The Sub-Committee commenced 
w-ork on  November 12, 1990 and issued its Consultative Dorrtmmt on  Hank- 
ruptcy in August 1993."' In  accordance with standard practice, the C[>nrultntive 
Document was circulated to interested professional bodies and experts for 
comment. After reviewing the submissions, the Law Retorm Commission 
published its final recommendations for bankruptcy law reform in its Repon on 
Bankruptcy in May 1995." 'l'hcsc recommendations (which, for the most part, 
adopted the proposals of the Sub-Committee on  Ins~lvency '~)  were incorporated 
"See Official Receiver's Office Website, n. 38, above. 
'' The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-Committee on Insolvency, Con- 
sulrative Document on Bankruptcy (August 1993) [hereinafter the Consultar~ve Document 
on Bankruptcy]. 
'I The Lam Reform Commisszon of Hang Kong, Report on Bankruptcy (May 1995) 
[hereinafter the Report on Bankruptcy]. 
"But see the Law Reform Commission's discussion of the jurisdictional criterion 
involving the presence of assets, paras 2.12-2.36, at  23-29, and of the relation back doctrine, 
paras 14.5-14.13, at 134-137. 
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into the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill" and then into the B.A.O. Although the 
B.A.O. was enacted in December 1996, it was not brought into force until 
amendments were drafted to [he Bankruptcy Rules (the "Bankruptcy Kulcs")." 
Part of the reason for the lengthy delay was that the I-Iong Kong economy in late 
1996 remained strong and there was little incentive to give high priority t o  
drafting new insolvency laws at that time. However, this process was finally 
completed in early 1998 and the new bankruptcy law and rules came into 
operation on April 1, 199S.45 
The second area of review-corporate rescue and insolvent trading-led to the 
publication of the Sub-Committee's Consultation Paper on  C o ~ o r a t e  Rescue and  
Insolvent Trading in June 1995'6 and t o  the Law Reform Commission's Report on  
Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (the Report o n  Corporate Rercue) in 
October 1996,4'both of which proposed that a provisional supervision procedure 
be enacted to facilirate corporate rescue. The drafting of a bill was delayed by 
disagreement as to how best t o  deal with the rights of workcrs during provisional 
supervision. C)n December 21, 1998, the Financial Services Bureau issued a short 
consultation document on this topic, the Consultation Paper on  Corporate Krscue 
and  the  Protection of Wages on  I n s o l ~ ~ e n c ~  Fund ( F e u t m e n t  of E7nployers in  
"Provisional Supen!ision") (the "FSB Corrsultation Paper o n  Corporate Re~cue") .~ '  
The  consultation period lasted until March 31, 1999, and on June 2, 1999 the 
Financial Services Bureau circulated a paper cntitled, Report on  Consultarion on  
Proposed Statutory Procedures for Co?porate Rescue, that the Financial Services 
Bureau submitted to the Legislative Council for Financial Affairs." The Com- 
panies (Amendment) Bill 2000 was gazetted in early 2000 but  the corporate rescue 
provisions encountered serious opposition. The result was that thc corporate 
rescue (and insolvent trading) provisions were cut from the Bill. Further dctails 
are provided in the l'ostscript. 
The third area of review-winding-up-is at an earlier stage. The  Sub- 
Committee on Insolvency issued its Cr~nsukatiorz Paper on  the  Winding-Up 
"Uankn~ptcy (Amendment) Bill 1996, Legal Supplemetit No. 3 to the Hong Kong 
Government Gazette, March 1, 1996. 
"The Hong Kong Bankruptcy (Amendment) Rules 1998 (L.N. 77 of 1998) (February 13, 
1998). Thc Hung Kong Bankruptcy Rules, cap 6, sub. Leg. A,, L.H.K., are in the form of 
subsidiq- legislation dealing with procedural aspects o f  bankruptcy. 
'5See the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 1996 (76 of 1996) (Commencement) 
Notice 1998 (L.N. 158 of 1998) (February 20, 1998). 
' 6  The Law R e f o m  Commission of Hong Kong Suh-Committee on Insolvmcy, Consulta- 
tion Paper on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading Uune 1995) [hereinafter the 
Consultation Paper on Corporate Rescue]. 
+' The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Corporate Resctre and 
Insolvent Trading (October 1996) [hereinafter the Reporr on Corporate Rercu.cj. 
'' The Hong Knng SAR Financial Services Bureau [hereinafter the Financial Services 
Bureau], Consultation Paper on Corporare Rescue and the Protection of Wages on Insoluenq 
Fund (Treatment of Employees in "Provisional Supewision")December 21, 1998) [hcrein- 
after the FSB Consultario~z Paper on Co7porate Resole]. 
'' Financiul Services Bureau, Report on Consultatiorl on Proposed Statutory Procedures for 
Corporate Rescue, submission to the Legislative Council for Financial Affairs Ou11e 2, 1999). 
These recommendarions are discussed in the text acconlpanying nn. 29-30, below. 
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Provisions of the Companies Ordinance in April 1998," which was open for 
comment until the end of July 1998. A Law Reform Commission report was 
issued in July 1999 (the Report on  the Winding-Up P ~ v ~ ~ i s ~ o r ~ s  of the  Compa~zies 
Ordirzance), to  be followed by the gazetting and enactmrr~t of new Icgislation in 
2002. 
II. Bankruptcy LawS' 
Changing Philosophical Underpinnings 
The B.A.O. makes the first cotnpreller~sive changes t o  Hong  Kong bankruptcy 
law in over a century. Although these changes were made in an "Amendment" 
Ordinance, they resulted in a dramatic overhaul of Hong  Kong bankruptcy law 
and process. Archaic nineteenth-century legislation has given way to  a progressive 
twentieth-century approach that better reflects the existing commercial and social 
practices. Thus, many old premises have been replaced. For example, the primary 
focus on  a debtor's wrongful behaviour under the old law has given way t o  an 
acknowledgment that a debtor's ir~solverlcy tr~ight well have been caused by  poor, 
o r  badly timed, business o r  personal financial decisions. Thus, many of the harsh 
anti-debtor policies in thc olcl law havc hccn Iihcralised. For example, under the 
new law it will he much easier for a debtor to  obtain a dischargc from bankruptcy 
and to  retain a greater portion of his pre-bankruptcy personal property. And the 
enactment of R voluntary arrangement procedure increases the likelihood that 
many debtors will be able to  avert the need to  resort t o  bankruptcy at all. 
The  reliance in the old law on  the wrongful nature of a debtor's conduct as a 
justification for the commet~cemet~t  of bankruptcy was most evident in the use of 
the concept of "acts of bankruptcy", which dates back to  English statutes from the 
Middle Ages5* This notion required that a debtor commit an "act of bankruptcy" 
before creditors were allowed to for the debtor's bankruptcy. Most of ~hr:  
former acts of bankruptcy in thc old acction 3 01 the Bai~kruptcy O r J i ~ i a r ~ c e  sct 
out vatious types of wrongful conduct b y  a dcbtor-such as making a fraudulrnt 
convey~ncc5'  or  removing one's property from Hong  Kong with the intent to  
defeat or  delay one's creditors.54 However, it is quite telling that, although the 
majority of the acts of bankruptcy focused o n  a debtor's wrongful behaviour, 
perhaps 95 per cent of bankruptcy cases under the old law were commenced by 
'" The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Sub-Commzttee on Insolvency, Consulra- 
rcon Paper on the Winding-up Provi~ionr of thc Companies Ordinance (April 1998). 
5' This section incorporates portions of the author's earlicr work, "Leaping forward to 
1997: Bankruptcy Law Kcform in Ffong Kong", 6 Intematronal Insolvency Rex 183 (1997) 
[hereinafter "Bankruptcy Law Rcforrn in Hong Kong"]. Scc also Booth, "Kcccnt Dcvclop- 
ments in Hnng Kong Bankroptry Law Reform", n. 36, ahove. 
"See "Act Against Such As Do Makc Bankrupt", 34 and 55 Hcnry VIII ch. 4 (1542); 13 
Eliz. ch. 7 (1571). 
'' Bankruptcy Ordinance, old s.3(l)(b). 
54 ibid. s,3(l)(d). 
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creditors relying on  a debtor's failure to  comply with a bankruptcy notice under 
the old section 3(l)(g) of the Bankruptcy O r d i n a n ~ e . ' ~  
In replacing acts of bankruptcy with new grounds, the starting-point was this 
95 per cent figure and the notion that bankruptcy should normally he premisrd 
on  a debtor's inability t o  pay. Thus, the new grounds include the following: 
(i) a debtor's failure to  comply within three weeks with a s t a t u t ~ r y  der~land 
for the repayment of HK$10,000 or mores6; 
(ii) a debtor's failure to  satisfy an execution of a judgment rlcht for 
HK$10,000 o r  more5'; and 
(iii) a debtor's default in connection with a voluntary 
However, no t  all of the new grounds are based solely on the financial difficulties 
of a debtor, fo r  the new section 6(4) also includes a fourth ground premised on  the 
absconding of a debtor or  the intention of a debtor to  abscond. This ground, 
which has its origins in the former section 3(l)(d) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, 
was enacted in p a n  t o  address a concern in the run-up to the 1997 transition. that 
det~tors  were incurring substantial debts that they had no  intention of repaying 
and then absconding from Hong K ~ n g . ' ~  
The abolition of the acts of bankruptcy also led to  changes in the jurisdictional 
criteria6> that must be satisfied to  ensure that a debtor has sufficient contacts with 
Hong  Kong t o  justify rhe commencement of a bankruptcy under Hong  Kong law. 
Under  the old law the jurisdictional criteria had t o  be satisfied at the time of the 
occurrence of an act of bankruptcy61 and, in the case of a creditor's petition, at 
the time that (or, for some of rhe factors, within a year hefore the date on  which) 
the bankruptcy petition was filed." With acts of bankruptcy now gone, the 
relcvant starting-point for  determining jurisdiction is the day of the bankruptcy 
55 Consultative Document on Banhruptq, n, 40, above, para. 2.13, at 10. 
56 Bankruptcy Ordinance, new ss.6 81. 6A(l)(a), (2). The minimum drbt upoz~ wltich a 
creditor may petition fur a dcbtor's bankruptcy has been raised from HK$5.000 to 
HK$10,000. See the new s.6(2)(a). In addition, the inclusion of a thrre~week period tracks 
the existing practicc in s.178(1) of the Companies Ordinance for use in corporatc 
insolvencies. Finally, the statutory demand will no longer have to he based on a judgnlent. 
This follows from thc deletion of the old s3(l)(g) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance by s.4 of the 
U.A.O. - .  
57 Bankruptcy Ordinance, new ss.6 & 6A(l)(b). 
~bld ,  new s.3(l)(c); new s.20L. 
Consultative Docnmcnt on Bankruptcy, n. 40, above, para. 2.19, at 12. 
''As well as to the abolition of the "relation back" doctrine, which was based on the 
notion that the commencement of a debtor's bankruptcy had relation hack to the occurrence 
of the act of bankruptcy upon which a receiving order was made (or, where the debtor had 
committed more than one act, to the earliest act of h.~nkruptcy within the three months 
before the filing of the petition). Under the old law, the dcbtor's bankruptcy was deemed to 
commence at that datr, and the debtol's property vested in the trustee as of that date as well. 
This enabled a trustee to overturn transactions to the detriment of the estate that were 
cntcrcd into by the debtor from that dare onw-ard. See the Report on Bunkruptqf, n. 41, 
above, paras 14.2-14.4 at 133-134. Ncw s.42 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance abolishes the 
relation back doctrine. 
6' Bankruptcy Ordinance, old s.3jzj. 
" ibid. old s.6(l)(d). 
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petition. The new section 4 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, which is based on 
section 265 of the United Kingdom Insolvency Act 1986 (the "U.K. Insolvency 
Act 1986");' provides as follows: 
"(1) A bankruptcy petition shall not be to the court . .  . unless thc 
debtor- 
(a) is domiciled in fIong Kong; 
(b) is personally present in Hong Knng on the day on which the petition is 
presented; or 
(c) at any time in the period of 3 years ending with that day- 
(i) has been ordinarily resident, or has had a place of residence, in 
Hong Kong; or 
(ii) has carried on business in Hong Kong. 
(2) The reference in sub-section (l)(c) to a debtor carrying on business 
includes- 
(a) the carrying on of business by a firm or of which the dcbtor 
is a member; and 
(b) the carrying on of business by an agent or manager for the debtor or for 
such a firm or partnership." 
These new jurisdictional criteria increase the relevant period of residency and 
carrying on of business from one to thrcc years. It must be kept in mind that 
satisfaction of the jurisdictional criteria does not automatically enable a bank- 
ruptcy case to go forward. Pursuant to the new section 5(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance, the court has the discretion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition or tu stay 
proceedings on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. 
Streamlining and Simplification of the Bankruptcy Process 
Many changes to the law were enacted to streamline and simplify the bankruptcy 
process. Some amendments track existing procedures in the Cornpa~iies Ordi- 
nance for corporate liquidation-thus the old two-step procedure, comprising the 
making of both a receiving order and an adjudication order, has been replaced 
with a one-step procedure involving the making of only a bankruptcy order. The 
theory behind the two-step procedure was that it provided the debtor with a 
period in which he could either pay his creditors in full o r  enter into a scheme of 
arrangement or composition with themb+ In practice, however, such settlements 
wcrc rare, and the entering of a receiving order was most frequently followed by 
the making of an adjudication order.65 
'' United Kingdom Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45 [hrreinafter the U.K. Insolvencp Act 
19861. 
64Reporr on Liankruptc), para. 5.7, at 42. 
6 5  ibid. paras 5 7 - 5 3 ,  at 42. 
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Many an~endnletlts were sought by the Official Receiver to enable his office to 
conduct hankruptcies more efficiently. The Official Receiver scrves as the trustee 
in almost all bankruptcy cases in Hong K ~ n g . ~ ~  The lack of a strong tradition of 
creditor participation in Hong Korlg bankruptcies has frequently caused diffi- 
culties for rhe Official Receiver-for example, in  regard to satisfying the qoorum 
requirements for meetings of crcdjtors. 1;) address such problems, the Official 
Receiver proposed that the bankruptcy procedures he streamlined and that he be 
given the discretion t o  dispense with various meetings and requirements. These 
recommendations were accepted by both the Suh-Committee on Insolvency and 
the Law Reform Commission6' and were enacted in the R.A.O. Among the 
changes were the following: 
the Official Receiver has been given the discretion t o  cancel unnecessary 
meetings and to decide within 12 weeks of the making of the bankruptcy 
order whether o r  not to serve as the bankruptcy trusteehR (except in cases 
where a criminal bankruptcy order has been rnadr)hy; 
the first meeting of the creditors' committee (formerly the "committee of 
inspection") must he held within three months of the trustee's appoint- 
ment, o r  of the establishment of the conlnlittee, whichever is later," and 
subsccluent mcctings are to be held when determined by the trustee o r  if 
so requested by a rnembcr of the committee or as specified hy  the 
creditor's committee"; and 
the quorum for meetings of creditors has been reduced to two creditors 
present or represented at a meeting." 
""For example, between 1959 and 1992, the Official Receiver served as trt~stee in all hut 
four cases. Annual Departmenrnl Report of the Hong Koxg Regirtrnr General, 1.991-1992, 
para. 108, at 40 (1992). 
 see, e.g. Conrulrntiri~ Docum~nt on Bankruptry. ch. 9, at 60-65; Rrpurt on Bankruptcy, 
ch. 8 ,  a t  67-72. 
"See Bankruptcy Ordinance, new s.I7A(l), which requires the Official Keceiver to 
decide (in cases not involving a sunlrnary administration of the bankrupt's assets under 
s.112A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance) as soon as practicable within 12 weeks from the date 
of the bankruptcy ordcr, whcthcr or not to call a first meeting of creditors for the purposc 
of appointing a trustee of the hankrnpt's estate. I f  the Official Receiver does not call such 
a meeting, he becomes thc tmstcc ol  the debtor's estate, aid must give notice to all creditors 
of his decision (new s.l7A(3j(4)). New s.17B allows creditors to request the Official 
Receiver to hold a rnccting for thc purpuae of selecting a trustee, and the Official Receivcr 
must summon such a meeting if the request appears to be made with the concurrence of not 
less than a quarter, in value, of the bankrupt's creditors. For a critique of the new procedure 
involving ss.l7A and 17B, see Booth, "Bankruptcy Law Reform in Hong Kong", n. 51, 
above, at 195. 
'' Bankn~ptcy Ordinance. new s.liA(2). 
Bankruptcy Rules, new r.lZZZG(2). 
" Rather than meeting monthly as was required under old s.24(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinancc. 
"Bankruptcy Rules, r. 1221.1. Both the Sub-Committee on Insolvency and the Law 
Rcform Commission had recon~~ne~ided a quorum of only one creditor. 
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O t h e r  amendments  r ~ ~ a c r r d  in the  R.A.O. t o  improve h a n k r u ~ t c y  procedures 
include changes t o  thc  procedures regarding t h e  s ta tement  of affairs"; amend-  
ments t o  the  prt)ccJures for  the  holding of public examinations of the  debtor7'  
a n d  of private examinations of third parties a n d  t h e  deb to^'^; and  the  aboli t ion of 
t h e  t iming requirements for  the  declarat ion a n d  distr ibution of  dividend^.'^ 
Al though m a n y  of the  recommendat ions  of the  Official Receiver increase his 
discret ion and t h e  scope  of his powers,  t h e  L a w  Reform Commiss ion  was aware 
of the  need t o  enable creditors  t o  p d ~ t i c i p a t e  in the  bankruptcy  process. M o s t  
importantly, t h e  Commiss ion  refusrd t o  recornmend the  adopt ion  of the  U.K. 
practice of n o t  appointing a creditors '  committee where  thc Official  Rccciver 
selves as the trustee. I t  noteti that, s ince the  Official Receiver serves 2s the  trustee 
in niost I ~ a n k r u ~ t c i e s ,  adopt ion  of this  provision " would  effectively mean  that  
"See the follow-ing sections of the Bankruptcy Ordinance: new s.IX(1) (requiring the 
debtor to file a statement of affairs witliirl 21 days of the day of the bankruptcy order in 
cases commenced by a crrdirnr); new . l a ( ? )  (requiring the debtor to file the statement of 
affairs with the petition when the debtor petitiolis for his on-n bankruptcy; new s.lg(3)ja) 
(giving the Official Reccivrr the discretiori to dispense with the statement of affairs in case? 
where he considers i t  unnrrrssar); without having to apply for an order of the court as was 
required under old r. 81A uf thr Bankruptcy Rulcs); and new s.l8(3)(b) (giving the Official 
Rccciver the power to extend thr timz for stlhmission of the statement of affairs without 
having to file a ce~tificatr ~ I I  couri, as wab required under old r. 82 o l  the Bankruptcy 
Rulcs). 
" See Bankruptcy Ord~nance, new s.19(1) (requiring a public exarriiriatio~~ robe held orily 
when requestrd by  thc Official Receiver). See also new s.19(2) and (3) (requiring the Official 
Receiver to apply for an examination pursuant to a request from a creditor a-ttb or without 
tile conwrrence uf not less than one quarter in value of such creditors. However, where less 
than nne quarter in vnlr~e of the creditors coiicurs, the court has the discretion to decline to 
direct that a public cramination bc hcld.); new s.19(5) that the Official Rccciver, 
the Official Petitioner (whrrr a criminal bankruptcy ordcr has been made against the 
drbtor). the trustee, A special manager, or any creditor who has submitted a proof may take 
part in the public examination). Oiher changes include new- ~ . l r ( l )  (enahling a bankrupt at 
his own expense to employ legal rspreserrtation a t  the public exaniination); new s.19(7) 
(providing that thc bankrupt will have the right either to he read or to read the record of the 
rx~minarion; s.19(8) (providing the court with the discretion to order that the costs of an 
examination be bornc by creditors who required 3 p h l i c  examination in those case? where 
the courr finds that the exan1ination --as "frivolous or  vexatious"). 
"See amended s.29(3) (expanding the ?cope of a private examination to include "any 
other matter the court considers ielevdnt"); new s.29jIA) (providing that a third party 
respondent may be required to submit an affidavit "containing an account of his dealings 
with the bankrupt o r  to produce any documents in his possession or under his co~ltrol 
relating to the bankrupt o r  the hankmpr's dealings, affairs, o r  property"); new s.29(3A) and 
(3B) (providing that evely pelson ex.tmllled under s.29 nlust arrswer all questions put to him, 
but that evidence obtained in the examination may not be used against him in criminal 
proceedings except for purposes of peljury); amended s.29(4) and (5) ( p r o r i d i ~ l ~  that "[ilf on 
the examination of any person it appears to the court" that he is indebted to thc bankrupt 
o r  has in his possession any property of the bankrupt, the coult may order the individu.il 
to pay the debt In full o r  in part, o r  to deliver the property or  any part thcrcof to thc OI6cial 
Receiver or the trustee). 
"See a m r n d ~ d  5.67 Old s.67 required that the first dividend be declared and distributed 
within four months of the first meeting of creditors, with subsequent dividends being 
derlarcd and distributed at intervals not exceeding six months. 
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creditors' commit tees  wou ld  cease t o  exist".77 I n  addit ion,  several amendments  t o  
t he  Bankrup tcy  Ord inance  increase the  control  of b o t h  t he  cou r t  and unsecured 
creditors over t h e  t r u ~ t e e . ' ~  I n  addit ion,  the  B.A.O. made  several changes t o  t he  
law tha t  liberalise t h e  t l - e~ tmen t  of creditors." 
Modernisation of Procedures 
The desire t o  rnodcrnisc t h e  bankruptcy process has led t o  substantial changes 
regarding of debts  and  interest  on  dehts.  A m o n g  t h e  m o r e  impor tan t  
amendments  t o  t he  proof  of d e b t  procedures is t h e  change t o  section 34(1) of the  
Bankruptcy  Ordinance ,  which  n o w  allows p roo f s  of debt  f o r  nnliquidatcd tor t  
claims t o  be admi t ted  i n  bankruptcy.  This  amendmen t  abolishes the  long-held, bu t  
n o w  archaic, dist inction between unliquidated contract  claims (which were  
al lowed u n d e r  t he  pre-amended ordinance) a n d  unliquidated tor t  claims (which 
we re  not). These  changes reflect t he  views of the  Cork Report in the  Uni ted  
Kingdom: 
I t  is a basic principle of the l aw  of insolvency that  evcry deb t  o r  liability 
capable of being expressed i n  m o n e y  terms should  b e  eligible f o r  proof in the  
insolvency proceedings,  s o  tha t  t he  insolvency administrat ion should deal 
comprehensively wi th ,  a n d  i n  o n e  way o r  anothcr  discharge, all such debts 
and  liabilities." 
O t h e r  changes include t he  following: providing for  the  handling of issues 
involving claims i n  foreign cur rency  and  cur rency  conversion matterss'; and  
"Report un  bankrupt^, para. 9.15, at 79. 
'' See, e g .  Bankruptcy Ordinance, new s.61 (including three additional powers for which 
the trustcr must seek the permission of the creditors' committee before raking action); new 
s.6lA (providing that "[tlhe exercise by the trustee of the powers conferred by Sections 60 
and 61 [of the Bankruptcy Ordinance] shall be sl~bject o the conrrol of the cnurt, and any 
creditor may apply to the court with respect to any exercise or  proposed exercise of any of 
those powers"); amended s.84 (going "some way rowards imposing a statutory duty on 
rrusrees in providing that a trustee may be liable for his actions in the event that he behaves 
in~properly" in several detincd circumstances. Report on Rdnkruptcy, para. 9.33, at 
84-85). 
"See, e.g. Bankruptcy Rules, new r. 122ZP (enabling the agreement of members of the 
creditors' commirtce to a resulution to be obtained by p o s ~ ,  rather than only at a meeting); 
Bankruptcy Ordinance, amended r.24(2) (permitting memhers of the creditors' committee 
to be represented by any person in possession of a letter of authority). 
8 0 1 n s ~ I ~ c r ~ ~ y  Law and Practice; Report of the R e v i m  Committee (Cmnd. 8558, 1982), 
under the Chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Cork: CBE [hereinafter the Cork Report], para. 
1289 (quoted in the Report on Bankruptr): para. 15.5, at 140). 
"See Bankruptcy Ordinance, new s.34(3B) (requiring that the value of foreign currency 
debts be determined by converting the amount of such debts into a Hong Kong dollar 
equivalent as of thc date of the making of the bankruptcy order). See Report on Bankruptcy, 
para. 15.7, at 140; new s.34(3C) (permitting the trustee to pay dividends in respect of foreign 
currency claims either in Hong Kong dollars or  in the foreign currency equivalent of Hong 
Kong dollars; when payment is made in the foreign currency equivalent, the amount of the 
dividend is to be determined by using the conversion rate as of the day of the payment of 
the dividend); new s.61(k) (permitting the trustee (with the permission of the creditor's 
committee and aftcr taking expert advice) to delay cvnvrrsion of foreign currency into Hong 
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providing tha t  n o  government fine u r  monetary  penalty will b e  admissible t o  
proof
s2 and therefore will no t  b e  releascd b y  the  bankrupt's discl~arge." 
Section 71 of t he  Bankruptcy  Ordinance  provides f o r  the  treatment of matters  
involving interest  o n  debt  in bankruptcies. A serious problem arising under  the  
o ld  section 7 l ( l )  was  the  8 per cent  pe r  a n n u m  limitation o n  interest o n  debts  u p  
t o  t he  da te  of the  receiving order.'" This  restriction required a t rus te r  to 
recalculate the  interest o n  any  d e b t  wi th  a n  interest rate greater t han  8 pe r  cent. 
T o  address this problelrt, the  8 per  cent  limitation was abolished a n d  replaced b y  
t he  new srct ion 71(1), which provides tha t  interest is provable u p  t o  t h e  t ime of 
t he  commencement  of the  
Automatic Discharge and Exempted Propetfy 
A m o n g  the  mos t  impor tan t  changes made  by the  B.A.O. are the amendments  
regarding the  debtor's discharge and  the  p rope r ty  tha t  may  be retained by  the  
debtor.  T h e  olrl section 30 provided for  t he  discharge of bankrupts,  bu t  the  criteria 
were  s o  difficult t o  satisfy tha t  i n  practice bankruptcy  became a "life sentence" for  
most  bankrupts  in H o n g  K ~ n g . ' ~  This  factor, perhaps more  than  a n y  other, was  
responsible f o r  the  low number  of filings by debtors under  the  old law. 
T h e  new  discharge provisions, which  incorpora t r  aspects f r om bo th  U .K .  and 
Australian law, reflect t he  mode rn  trend t o  enable most  bankrupts  t o  emerge  f rom 
bankruptcy w i t h  a "fresh start" after a reasonable period of time. Thcsc  new 
provisions are primari ly responsible for  t he  dramat ic  increase i n  the  number  of 
bankruptcy  peti t ions being filed by deb to r s  since t he  new law came in to  
Kong dollars). For a more detailed discussion of the amendments relating to foreign 
currency claims, scc Booth, "The Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong Inrolvrncy Law", 
n. 23 above, at 74-76. 
'' See Bankmptcy Ordinance, new s.34(3A). This amendment changrd rhe rrrnrment nf 
such debts in Hong Rong, because although the pre-B.A.O. law did not provide that fines 
and penalties were provable, the practice was that they were. See Report on Bankruptcy, 
para. 15.29, at 145. 
"See Bankruptcy Ordimnce. new s.32(5). 
In compulsory liquidations, the limitation applied up to the ddte of the filing of the 
winding-up petition. See Keport on Bankruptcy, para. 19.4, at 183. In some corporate cases, 
this involved reviewing thousands of accounts over a number of years, para. 19.6, at 184. 
' 5  New s.71(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance inc l~~des  guidelines regarding the 
payment of interest our of the surplus remaining after the payment of provable debts. It sets 
the rate of interest at the higher of the judgment rate or  the contractual race. Lastly, new 
subsection (4) applies to dehts for which interest is not reserved or agreed fur, and which are 
ov.erdue at the comnlencement of the bankruptcy. In such cases, interest may be claimed at 
the judgment rate from the time the dcbt was payable, or  from the time a written d e m ~ n d  
has been nude, 31 rhe care may be, up to the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy. 
Similar amendments rrcre made to the Companies Ord i~~ance  for application in liquidations. 
See 5.43 of the Companirs (Amendment) Ordinance, Ord. No. 3 of 1997, L.H.K., wl~ich 
came into operation in February 1997. This section added to the Companies Ordinance new 
s.264A (Interest on dehts), which is applicable only to solvent companies, and s.264B 
(Extortionate credit trdnsac~ions). 
86 Report on Bankuuptcy, para. 17.1, at 156. For example, during the tell-year period from 
1983 to 1992, only 25 o i  toughly 2400 bankrupts were discharged, para. 17.8 at 161. 
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~pera t ion .~ '  In the case of a person not previously adjudged bankrupt, the new 
section 30A(2)(a) provides for the automatic discharge of the bankrupt at the end 
of four years from the date of the making of a bankruptcy order. In the case of a 
person who has previously been adjudged bankrupt, section 30h(2)(b) delays the 
discharge for an additional year. However, section 30A(3) provides that the date 
of discharge may be extended for specified periods in cases in which the trustee or 
a creditor raises a valid objection pursuant to new subsection (4). Among the 
objections which may be raised are the following: that a first-time bankrupt is 
likely within five years of the date of the bankruptcy order to be able to make a 
significant contribution to his estate; that the bankrupt's discharge would 
prejudice the administration of his estate; that the bankrupt has failed to 
co-operate in the administration of his estate; that the bankrupt's conduct has 
been unsatisfactory; that the bankrupt has departed from Hong Kong and failed 
to comply with a request by the Official Receiver or trustee to return to Hong 
Kong; that the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing that he was 
insolvent; that the bankrupt has committed a bankruptcy offence; and that the 
bankrupt has failed to prepare an annual report for the trustee. 
The new scction 3OA(9) provides that a bankrupt who receives a discharge may 
be required to continue contributing to his estate for up to eight years from the 
date of the bankruptcy order." The new section 30B allows bankrupts to apply to 
the court for an early discharge. In  esscnce, the harshness of the former discharge 
regime has been replaced with a new regime that offers attractive inducements for 
bankrupts to cooperate (such as the automatic discharge or an early discharge) and 
serious repercussions for bankrupts who fail to  cooperate (such as a delay in, o r  
prevention of, the making of the discharge where valid objections are made by the 
trustee or creditors). 
Transitional provisions were included in the B.A.O. to address the situation of 
the thousands of bankrupts in Hong Kong who had been adjudicated bankrupt 
under the old bankruptcy law. The new section 30C of the Bankruptcy Ordinance 
provides, as a rule, that first-time bankrupts who have been bankrupt for 42 
months o r  more (or 54 months or more in the case of individuals who have 
previously been made bankrupt) shall be deemed to be discharged from bank- 
ruptcy one year after the day that the new discharge provisions come into 
operation (i.e. April 1, 1999) except in those cases in which the trustee o r  a 
creditor raises a valid objection.89 
Under the old bankruptcy provisions, most of a debtor's property was used to 
satisfy his creditors' claims. The old section 43 provided that a debtor was entitled 
"For example, the number of bankruptcy petitions filed by debtors from April 1, 1998 
to May 31,1999, was 1,468. To put the numbers in perspective, the number of filings in May 
1999 (253) was more than triple the total number of petitions filed by debtors during the 
four-year period 1994 to 1997 (75). See Official Receiver's Office Website, n. 38, above. 
Bankruptcy Ordinance, new s.30A(IO) includes further restrictions on the obtaining of 
a discharge hy debtors who remain out of Hang Kong or who leave Hong Kong without 
notifying the trustee of their itineraries and conract details. 
" A s  amended by s.lOl(a) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions and Minor 
Amendments) Ordinance 1997 (Ord. No. 80 of 1997). 
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t o  retain quite lirtle-goods up t o  a value of HK$3,000, inclusive of a dcl>tor's 
tools of trade and necessary wearing apparel and the bedding of himself and his 
dependants. Given the unreasonable and outdated limitations of this section, in 
practice the trustee usually ignored the limit3ti0n.'~'The new section 43 removes 
the HK$3,000 limitation and provides that a bankrupt is entitled to retain: 
(i) such tools, books, vehicles, and other items of equipment as are 
necessary to the bankrupt for use personally by tiin1 in his employment, 
business, or vocation; and 
(ii) such clothing, bedding, furniture, household equipment and provisions 
as are necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of the bankrupt 
and his family. 
The new section 43 also abolishes the outdated doctrine of "reputed ownership". 
This doctrine held that " if the debtor appeared t o  be in possession of property 
which secretly belonged to another, that would boost his creditworthiness, and 
therefore his creditors should be entitled to treat that property as part of the 
bankrupt's estate"." 
The old law provided that all post-petition property uf thr  debtor (for example, 
wages) vested in the trustee. This rule, of course,  roved administratively 
cumbersome and, as with the exemption requirements, was not strictly adhered to 
by trustees?' The new section 43A i~lcorporates the existing practice, for it 
that propcrty actluircd post-petition by a bankrupt does not vcst in the 
trustee unless the trustee servcs a notice in writing t o  so claim the propPrty. Since 
the category of exempted property has been dramatically expanded, the new 
section 43B enables a trustee to recover certain items of excess value. The 
new section 43C prescribes the time-limirs for recovering property under the new 
sections 43A and B, and the new section 43D sets forth the procedures whereby 
either a bankrupt or any of his creditors may apply t o  the court to include o r  
exclude any particular item from the estate. It should also he noted that pursuant 
to section 43, a trustee may seek the application of "an income paynlerrts order" 
pursuant ro wliicli the bankrupt must pay t o  his estare a portion of his income for 
the period in which the order is in eflect. 
The ameliorate the problems caused by high real estate prices in Hong Kong, 
section 43F of the new law entitles the b a n k n ~ p t  o  continue occupying the family 
home for a period of six months from the time of the making of the bankruptcy 
order and, in exceptional circumstances, for u p  to a full ycar. Similarly, the 
amended section 61 provides that when a trustee (with permission of the 
creditors' cummittec) allows a bankrupt to restructure his business where such 
restructuring is in the interests of the creditors, the trustee "may permit the debtor 
to retain any leasehold interest in property in which his business is situated". 
90 Report on Bl;nkruptiy, para. 13.5, ar 121.  
" I>. S. Sealy 81 David hlilman, Annotdted Guide lo the Insolvenq LeRzslarton (4th ed.. 
19943, Grl~eral note to section 283 of the U.K. Insolvency Act 1986, at  316. 
92 See R ~ p o r t  on Rdnkruptry, p r a .  13.51, at 130. 
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These amendments ensure that most debtors will be able to emerge frnm 
bankruptcy with sufficient personal bclongings to  provide a fresh start. More 
particularly, the new provisions regarding the exemptions for tools of trade and 
the restructuring of a busines~ increase the likelihood that a debtor will be able to 
remain solvent upon emerging from bankruptcy. I-Iowever, the interests of 
creditors are not ignorcd; both a trustee and a debtor's crctlitors will be able to 
apply t o  the court to  ensure rhar the bankrupt does nor unjustly benefit trom the 
post-petition acquisition of property and earnings or from the exemption of an 
unreasonably large amount of personal property. In addition, in some cases an 
inco~ne paymcnts order may be sought. 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements 
Under the old bankruptcy law, by the time a bankruptcy pctition was filed it was 
usually too late for the debtor to  negotiate a settlement with his creditors. The 
individual voluntary arrangement procedure (which is based on Part VIIl of the 
U.K. Insolvency Act 1986) is one of the mure important innovations of the new 
law and enables a debtor to  seek relief at an earlier stage of his financial difficulticr: 
with the aim, in most cases, averting the need to resort to bankruptcy. 
This procedure is set out in the new sections 20-20L of the Bankr~lprcy 
Ordinance. The new section 20A(I) provides that an application may Ile made t o  
the court for an interim order where the debtor intends to make a voluntary 
arrangement proposal?' The new section 20(2) provides that the making of such 
an order leads to  the imposition of a moratoriurn, which will provide the debtor 
with a "breathing spell" against the actions of unsecured creditors. During the 
moratoriurn, no b a n k n ~ ~ t c y  petition may be prescntcd o r  proceeded with against 
the debtor and no  other proceedings, execution, lcgal process, o r  distress may be 
commenced or continued against the debtor cxcept with the leave oi court. The 
inoratorium will thus encourage negotiation. However, as is generally the case in 
Hong  Kong insolvency law, secured creditors will not  be bound by the 
moratorium and will be free to  take steps to realise their security. The new section 
20F(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance further protects secured creditors by 
providing that any proposed voluntary arrangement that affects thc righrs of a 
secured creditor will only be effective if the secured creditor consents. 
Individual voluntary arrangements will prove beneficial to both debtors and 
creditors. By avoiding bankruptcy, debtors will be able to  avoid the resulting 
stigma as well as many of the disqualifrcations for undischarged bankrupts, such 
as the restriction against serving as a company director without the leave of the 
court94 or as practicing as a solicitor.95 Unsecured creditors are also Iikcly t o  
"'Thc application is to be made by the debtor, unless the debtor is an undischarged 
bankrupt, in which case eithcr the trusree or the Official Receiver may also file an 
application. Bankruptcy Ordinance, s.ZOA(3). A debtor's creditors may nor file an appli- 
cation. 
'' See Companies Ordinance, s.156. 
Legal Practitioners Ordinance, s.6(7) (cap. 159) L.H.K. (1999). 
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recover more in voluntary arrangements than they would in bankruprcy, as has 
been the experience in the United Kingdom." For these reasons, in the years to 
come, individual voluntary arrangements will surely nutnumhcr personal bank- 
ruptcies. But in the current recession, the financial circumstances of many debtors 
are so severe that it is too late t o  benefit from individual voluntary arrangements, 
and therefore debtors are instead resorting t o  bankruptcy. Thus, it is no surprise 
that the number of bankruptcies filed by debtors has soared since the new 
bankruptcy law came into operation o n  April 1, 1998.97 In theory, the individual 
voluntary arrangement procedure is also available to an undischarged ba~rkrupt , '~  
but the use of this procedure at such a late stage would be unlikely. 
Improved Avoidance P0wers9~ 
O n e  of the intended consequences of the B.A.O. was to improve the scope of the 
ineffective avoidance powers contained in the Bankruptcy Ordinance. Howcvcr, 
the situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that thcro was no mention in 
the B.A.O. as t o  whether the new avoidance powers were to be given retroactive 
effect. The result is that the old avoidance powers, namely the fraudulent 
preference provisions of the old sectlon 49 and the avoidance ot settlement 
provisions of the old section 47, conrinue to apply to all bankruptcy cases 
commenced prior t o  April 1, 1998. As for cases commenced on o r  after April 1, 
1998, the new avoidance powers are applicable in all cases commenced on o r  after 
April 1, 1998 ro all transactions occurring o n  or after that date. However, the old 
law continues t o  apply in cases commenced on or after April 1, 1998 to 
transactions occurring prior to that date.' 
The  old section 49 enables a trustce to avoid as a fraudulent preference, inter 
alia, any payment o r  transfer of property by a debtor to his creditor that is 
made: 
(i) with the "dominant intention" to prefer thc creditor; 
(ii) within six rnonths nf the commencement of the bankruptcy; and 
(iii) when the debtor is unable t o  pay his debts as rhey became due. 
Moreover, a payment or transfer made by a debtor under the fear of lcgal proccss 
o r  as the consequence of the prcssure of a creditor is not considered voluntarily 
q6 See Sealy & Milman, n. 91, above, General comment on Pan V111, U.K. Insolvency Act 
1986, at p. 3 i 3 .  
"See n. 87, abovc. See also Posrscripr, accompanying n. 41, below. 
9B Bankruptcy Ordinance, new s.201. 
'' For a detailed discussion of these powers, see Charles D. Rooth and Philip St J. Smart, 
"Thc Ncw Avoidance Powers under Hong Kong Insui~ency Law: A Move from Territorial- 
itv to Extraterritorialitv". 34 Int'l Law 255. 11999). \ ,  
"For further disc"&;" of this issue, see Charles D. Booth & I'hilip St J. Smart, 
"Retrospective or Prosprcti\~e?: Determining the Scope of Hong Kong's New Insolvency 
Law", 8 International Tnsolvency Rev. 27 (1999); Charles D. Booth & I'hilip St J. Smart, 
"New Insolvency Law: Traps and Gaps", Hong Kong Law. 62 uanuary 1999). 
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made and, therefore, may not be avoided as a fraudulent preference.' ' lhe  focus on 
the voluntary nature of thc drbtor's act--and therefore on the del>ror's state of 
mind in making a transfer or payment-means that the section often proves 
ineffective in making recoveries from creditors. 
The former section 47 has proved even less useful.' This section enables trustees 
to  avoid certain settlenients that the debtor has made within ten years of the 
debtor's bankruptcy. The provision suffers from many problems, such as that 
some of the exemptions are rathcr archaic. Moreover, the most frequently used 
defence t o  the trustee's attempt to  avoid a setrlement-that the settlement was 
"made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable 
consideration- has the potential for leading t o  litigation about whether there was 
"valuable consideration". 
Section 36 of the B.A.O. abolished these sections and replaced them with new 
provisions based on  sections 339-42 and 135 of the U.K. Insolvency Act 1986. 
The new section 49 allows the trustee to challenge transactions at an undervalue 
and section 50, unfair preferences. The new section 51(1) sets forth the time 
requirements for the application of these sections: five years from the day the 
bankruptcy petition is filed for a transaction at an undervalue; six months, for an 
unfair preference to  a persoti wtio is not an "associate" of the debtor; and two 
y e a r ,  for an unfair prefercnce to a person who is an "associate" of the debtor. 
"Associdte" is defmed in the new section 518 to include the debtor's spouse and 
relatives (and the spouse's relatives), as well as the debtor's business partners o r  
corporatio~ls controlled by the debtor. 
For  unfair preferences, the new section 50(4) replaces the dnniinant intcnliol~ to  
prefer a test with a rcquircment that the debtor is influenced by a "desire" to  put 
a creditor into an advantageous position. The new section 50(5), in turn, provides 
that an unfair preference by a debtor to an associate (other than by leason only of 
beixig the dch tor i  employee) is presumed, unless the contrary ir shown, to have 
been influenced by the dcsire of the dct3tor t o  put thc associate in an advantageous 
position. The new section 51(2) also rcquires that, for an unfair preference to be 
avoidcd, the debtor must be insolvent at the time of the transfer o r  become 
insolvent as a consequence of the preference. 
Thc new section 4 Y  provides that a t ransacl io~~ at an undcnralue may involve a 
gift, a transaction in consideration of marriage, or  a transaction in which the 
transferreh consideration is "significantly less" than the value of the debtor's 
consideration. The insolvency of a dcbtur is not a rclcvant factor for transactions 
a t  an undervalue that occur during the two-year period immediately preceding the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. For  transactions at an undervalue made between 
two and five years of the corirnlencemcnt of the bankruptcy, the dchtor must be 
insolvent for the transaction to be avoided; however, whcre a debtor prefers an 
associate (other than by reason only of being the debtor's employee), the debtor 
'Sce Shurp v. Jackson [I8991 A.C. 419, applied, e.g., in Re Kwong Sang Farm (1911) 6 
H.K.L.R. 113. 
'The same rnay he said of old s.31 ul the Bankruptcy Ordinance, which applies to 
fraudulent settlements. This section was repealcd by s.22 of thc B.A.O. 
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will be deemed to have been insolvent at the time of, o r  as a result of, the 
transaction, unless the contrary is shown. 
The new avoidance provisions improve upon thc old law, especially in regard t o  
transactions involving a\\ociates. However, although the new test of a "desire" to 
put a creditor in an advantageous position is easier t o  satisfy than that requiring 
a "dominant intention" to prefer, it would have been better for the legislation to 
have dropped the "desire" test and to have focused primarily on the effect of the 
transaction in question and on preventing "last minute grabs" by creditors.' 
Ill. Corporate Rescue5 
The most serious weakness in Hong  Kong insolvency legislation is the lack of a 
satisfactory corporate rescue procedure, with the result that under existing law it 
is difficult to reorganise or restructure a company in financial difficulty. As noted 
above, the options available t o  rescue a company are limited primarily t o  the 
following: (1) an informal workout (which in a multibank-lcnding situation 
involves the application of the H.K.A.B.'s Guidelines on Corporate D$fculties6); 
(2) receivership; or (3) section I66 of the Companies Ordinance. Section 166 is 
seldom used and receiverships that successfully rescue a company are also rare. 
Thus, under the existing framework, an informal workout is the preferred option 
for creditors and debtors alike. 
H.K.A.B. Guidelines 
These guidelines came into operation in April 1998 and are intended to facilitate 
corporate rescue in multibank-lending situations. The  Guidelcnes provide that, 
once it is public knowledge that a debtor company is in distress, the banks should 
be supportive of the company: "'I'hcy should not withdraw facilities o r  hastily put 
the company illto rcccivcrship, or issue..  . writs demanding repayment."' 
Although the H.K.A.H. Guidelines increase the likelihood of a negotiated 
solution, they too arc subject to limitations. First of all, they only apply t o  banks, 
and secondly (and more importantly), they require unanimity. Therefore, unless 
the banks agree to pay off the unsecured non-bank creditors (either in full or at 
least a substantial portion of their debts), such creditors are likely t o  commence 
o r  continue litigation against the company (perhaps with the aim of executing 
against the company's asscts) o r  ever1 t o  petition for the company to be wound up. 
'See, e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Code, s.547. Xed to the abolition of the 8 %  limitatiou 
(discussed in the text accomp~nying notes 84-85, above) was the enactment of another 
al-oidancr power, new s.71A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, which provides that on the 
application of rhe trustee the court is empowered to make an order with regard to 
extortionate credit transacrions entered into %.;thin three years of rhe commencement of the 
bankruptcy. 
This section is an updatcd and condensed version of the author's earlier work, "Hong 
Kong corporate rescue proposals", n. 33, above. 
"See n. 34, above. 
' ibid., para. Z(a). 
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Thus? i ~ o m  thc perspectives nf both debtors and creditors, the need remains for 
the enactment of a iornial legislative rescue procedure that does not rcquire 
unanimous approval of creditors, that protects the rights ot employees, and that 
functions efficic~r~ly. 
Receivership 
As noted in Part I above, pursuant to a typical debenture, upon the occurrence of 
certain specified evenrs of default, the holder of a fixed charge may appoint a 
receiver, o r  the holder of 2 floating charge may appoint a receiver and manager. 
The chairman of the Sub-Corn~uittee on Insolvency has ohserved that "[bJecause 
receivers sometimes 'save' companies in financial difticolties thev have been callcd 
'company doctors' . . . "' flowever, the ability of a receiver to  "save" a company 
ultimately depends on  whether thc secured creditor is adequately potected by the 
secrlrcd assets and on  whether this protection is likely to continue if the company 
continues trading. Frequently, however, a receivership ulrirnately leads to the 
liquidation of a cornpan): 
Section 166 
Finally, a company and its creditors could agree to enter into a coniprom;se or  a 
schernc of arrangement under sexion 166 of the Companies Ord i~~ancc .  Section 
166 may be utilised after a conlpany has bceli wound up. 'Cypically, however, a 
conipmy or its crerlitors propose a comprorrlise or  arrangement as a means of 
avoiding liquidation. For a proposal to be binding on creditors o r  classes of 
creditors, it must be accepted by a majority in number and three-quarters in value 
of the crediiors or classes of creditors (as the case m? be) who are presenr and t y  
voting either in person or  by proxy, and then t ~ e  sanct~oued by the court. 
' l 'her~ are several weaknesses with thc section 166 process: 
secured creditors retain vcto power over tlir restructuring procers 
because there is no mechanism to compel an 1111wiIIii~, o r  unco- 
operative, s~cured  crcditor to agree to a rnoditicatior~ of its contract 
rights'; 
there is no stay that binds the actions of c red~turs '~ ;  
and other problcnis frequently arise during the  reorganisation process, 
including difficulties in determining the proper classification of creditors, 
and t l ~ e  ovcrall process is expensive and time-consuming." 
'Edward L. G. 'lbler, "Proposal* for a New Corporgre Rescue Procedure in Hong 
Kong", In Leyd  Deve!op,~rr:ztr h China: Mnrbet Economy and L,rw, 54 (Wang Weiguo & 
IVei Zhenying eds., 1996). 
' Sce Cork Keport, n. RO, above, para. 418, at 101; Stcwair Smitl~, 3omc  Problcmr in 
Reorganising Insolvent Conlpanics", in f.aw Lecturer for Practitioner, 1983,23 1 (Malcolm 
Merry ed.. 1983). 
IDT1..e Report on Corporate Rcscue lists liiir ar thc major deficiency under 5.166. Report 
on Corporate Rercue, para. 1.2, p. 7. 
" ibirl., a t  244-217; Tyler. n. 107, ebovc, 21 55-56. 
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The overall result is that there are relatively few successful restructurings of 
substantial companies in Hong Kong under section 166.j2 
Proposed Provisional Supervision Procedures 
Provisional supervision is intcnJcd to supplcmcnt, rathcr than replace, section 166 
of the Companies Ordinance. Chapter 1 of the Report elucidares five advantages 
of provisional supervision over section 166. In short: 
(1) It will be easicr to calculatc the time and costs involved in putting a 
proposal to creditors under provisional supervision than is possible 
under the open-ended procedures in Section 166. 
(2) A moratoriun~ on creditors' actions will bc provided under provisional 
super\. ision. 
(3) The costs of court appearances will be decreased under provisio~~al 
supervision, as the number of court applications and hearings u.ill be 
limited. 
(4) Provisional supervision will include several innovations: 
(a) the role of the provisional supervisor will bc set out; 
(b) the provisional supervisor will be provided with the power of 
managemen? 
(c) 'rogue creditors' will be prevented from leueraging ttie~r position by 
threatening proceedings; 
(d) lenders during provisional supervision will benefit trom super 
priority; and 
(f) there will be a smooth transition into company voluntary arrange- 
ment or winding up, as the case may be; and 
(5) Provisional supervision will provide certainty; creditors will have the 
opportunity in most cases to vote on a proposal withi11 six rnonths." 
Commencement of Provisional Supetvision 
The provisional supervision "procedure aims to facilitate the rescue of those 
companies that have viable businesses which are worth saving in whole or in 
part"." The procedure will be applicable to Hong Kong companies (which are 
formed and rcgistered under Part I of the Companies Ordinance) and to oversea 
companies (which are registered under Part XI of the Companies Orditrance), 
with the exception of cel-rain regulated industries.15 I t  will also be availahlc to 
both solvent and insolvent companies. 
The procedure normally will be initiared by a majority of the directors of the 
company or by the members of a company by ordinary resolution. Where a 
winding-up petition has been filed but a winding-up order has not yet been made, 
a provisional liquidator may initiate the procedure (except where the directors 
"Report on Corporare Rescue, para. 1.2, a t  7. 
" ibid.. para. 1.7, at 8-9. 
14 . ' ibrd., para. 2.3, at 20. 
e.g., the banking, insurance, and securities and futures industries. ibid., paras 2.12-2.23, 
22-25. 
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have made a declaration under section 228A of the Companies Ordinance). Where 
a liquidator has been appointed, the liquidator's consent will he necessary for a 
provisional supervision to  go forward. In addition, in certain circumstances a 
receiver appointed over the whole o r  substantially the whole of a company's assets 
may initiate the procedure. 
The Provisional Supervisor 
The party that initiates the procedure will nominate the "provisional supervisor", 
the person responsible for preparing the corporate rescue proposal. The provi- 
sional supervisor will be chosen from a panel of insolvency practitioners (initially, 
accountants) in ordcr of rotation." In addition t o  formulating a draft plan of 
volunta~y arrangement, during the period of provisional supervision, the provi- 
sional supelvisor's other functions will include "manag[ing] the affairs, business 
and property of the company with the primary purpose of preserving the assets 
of the company for the creditors as a whole"." To assist him in achieving his 
goals, Chapter 8 of the Report on Corporate Rescr~r outlines the provisional 
supervisor's powcrs, and Chapter 9, his duties, rights, and liabilities. 
Upon his appointment, the prol,isional supervisor will take control of thc 
company and the pourcrs of directors will be suspended. Thus, although the 
directors will normally initiate the procedure, as a rule the provisional liquidator 
will immediately displace thcm. (This fact in and of itself may lead, at least 
initially, to  few initiations by thc directors of small- to medium-sized family- 
controlled companies.'') However, the provisional supervisor may choose to  
delegate ccrtain powers back to  the directors, in which case the directors will be 
answerablc to  him. Clearly, provisional supervision will more likely succeed in 
cases in which the directors co-operate with the provisional supervisor. Such 
co-operation is likely to be more forthcoming from the directors of larger. public 
companies. 
Company officers and other specified individuals will be required to provide 
the provisional supervisor with a statement of affairs. This i~lformation will assist 
the provisional supervisor in assessing the company's financial position and in 
deciding whether t o  formulate a plan of voluntary arrangement. The provisional 
supervisor will be required to  draft his assessment in the form of a report that will 
assist creditors in making an informed decision as to  whether t o  support the 
proposed corporate rescue proposal. 
'"I'his panel will be similar to a scheme used at present in non-sun~n~ary compulsory 
liquidations. The panel will he composed of firms that have at least two yalified 
practitioners with thc rquired amount of insolvency experience, ibid., paras 7.4-7.6, a t  
48-49. I n  exceptional circumzrance, the court may approve thr appointment of an individual 
not nn the panel who possesses skillr not available on  the panel. 
"ibid., para. 8.7(h), a t  54. 
"Of course, the directors would have to he careful chat they did not continue trading 
when "there was no reasonable prospect of preventing the company becolning insolvent", 
or they would risk liability for the proposed oftence of "insolvent trading". ibid. para. 19.1 
and Ch. Ir generally. 
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The provisional supervisor's powers include the powers to borrow money, to 
grant charges o>er the company's assets, and to disrlairn onerous contracts." 
There are limitations, however-for exan~ple, a provisional supervisor will not be 
dllowed t o  dispose of assets secured by a charge without receiving rhe consent of 
the holder of the charge.23 
The Moratorium 
The "cornerstone" of provisional supervision is the i~iclusior~ of a ~noratorium, o r  
stay of proceedings." With a moratoriun~ in place, provisional supervision will be 
able to avoid the problems that occur under section 166-such as a single creditor 
prescnting a winding-up petition against the company o r  a secured creditor 
appointing a receiver to realise the assets subject to its charge. It will also create 
a "cooling-off" period during which the provisional supervisor may meet with 
creditors with the aim of structuring a proposal. 
An intended goal of the procedure is for the provisional supervisor to 
determinc as quickly as possible wlrether thc company is likely to be saved. 
Therefore, the moratoriun~ will only last for an initial thirty-day period. During 
this period, the provisional supervisor will be expected to determine ~ h e c h e r  
the purposes of a voluntary arrangement are capable of being achieved. If the 
provisional supervisor is able to formulate a plan within that pe~-iod, the 
moratorium may continue for up t o  six months; if the supervisor is 
unable to formulate a plan within the thirty days, then he nlust apply to thc court 
for an extension?' However, in no case nlay the moratorium cxtend beyond six 
months except with the agreement of creditors?' Thc aim is for the provisional 
supervisor t o  put a proposal to creditors for a voluntary arrangement within six 
months, and the moratorium is structured t o  assist in achieving this goal. 
A major improvement over scction 166 is that the provisional supelvision 
moratorium also applies to secured creditors. However, the moratorium against 
secured creditors is not as (ar-reaching as ir first appears-some secured creditors, 
those defined in the Report on Covpordte Rescue as "major secured creditors" are 
given the right to elect whether or not t o  participate in a provisional suprrvision." 
A major secured creditor is defined as a "holdrr of any chargc [whether fixed or 
floating or a combination of the two] over thc wholc o r  substantially the wholc 
of a company's assets, whose level of exposure o r  lending would warrant such an 
extensive ~harge" .~ '  If a rnajur secured creditor elects not to participate, then 
l 9  ibid., para. 8.25(g) & (j), ar 58. 
20 . ' rbrd., para. 13.17, at 79. 
ibid., para. 5.2, a t  33. 
" ibid., paras 5.13-5.14, at 35. 
" ibid., para. 5.5 n t  33; para. 5.32, at 40. 
" ibid., pera. 13.8, at 76-77. 
"ibid., paras 13.7-13.8, at 76.'l'he level of cxposure was later changed in the Companies 
(Amendment) Bill 2000 to refer rn nor less than one-third of the 1iabii;ties of the company 
immcdiatcly before the day that provisivnal supcrvision cnmmences. 
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provisional supervision will immediately cease. Non-major secured creditors will 
not have the option of electing whether or not to participare. 
Any secured creditor t h a ~  clects to participatc, or which does not have the right 
to electing to participate, will be bound by the moratorium. During the 
continuance of the stay, a hccured creditor may not appoint a receiver; if the 
creditor has already done so: the receiver may not exercise any powers incidental 
to receivcrslrip. Furthermore, a secured creditor may not enforce its charge over 
the company's property or repossess goods in the compzny's possession. 
Treatment of Employees 
At present, when a cornpany is wound up, employees are entitled to seek 
paymeuts from the Protection of Wages on Insolvc~~cy Fund, for certain unpaid 
wages, unpaid wages in lieu of notice, and unpaid severance pa~ments. '~ Under 
the proposed provisional supervision scheme, many employees will retain jobs 
that would otherwise have been lost if their employer had been wound up. 
However, in many cases some employees will be laid off in a cost-saving move by 
the provisional supervisor. The Report on Corporate Rescue proposed that 
statutory changes he enacted to enable such employees to claim upon the 
I'rotection of Wages on Insolvency F ~ n d . ~ '  However, the financial consequences 
of this proposal have Icd to much debate. In December 1998, the Financial 
Scrviccs Bureau, issued its fSB Cbnsaltation Paper on Corporate Re~cae,'~ which 
set fonh the following four uptiuns for comment: 
Option A-Protection of Wages on I~~solvency Fund to pay (Law 
Reform Commissiu~r P~oposal): widen the ambit of the Protection of 
\Vages on Insolvency Fund to accommodate employees affected by 
provisional supervision; 
Option B-employer to pay in full prior to initiating corporate rescue: 
require the company to clear all arrears of wages before it urtdergoes 
corporate rescue; 
Option C-to exempt all err~ployees from the moratorium: not have the 
moraiorium bind employecs and allow them to petition any time to the 
court for the company to be wound up. The Pnltection of Wages on 
Insolvency Fund to pay upon the presentation of a winding-up petition 
against the company by employees but the company may, instead of 
being wound up, continue as a going concern under corporate rescue. 
Option D-Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund to pay first, then 
seek 100 per cent recourse from the company as a priority debt in a 
voluntary arrangement: widen the ambit of the Prntection of Wages on 
z6 PIO~CCC~OJI  of Wages o n  Insolvency C)rdinance, s.15 (cap. 38G. I..H.K., 1999). The 
Protection of Wagc~ on Insolvency Fund, in turn, attempts to recoup such payments in the 
company winding-up See Companies Ordinance, s.265. 
"Report on C u p m i t e  Rrrrur, pira. 5.42 at p. 42. 
See n. 48. above. 
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Insolvency Fund to allow employees to get quick relief, but sitnultane- 
ously require that payments so made by the Fund be treated as a priority 
debt in a voluntary arrangement plan of the company. 
After reviewing the 26 submissions made in regard to its Con.ultation Paper o n  
Corporate Rescuc, the Financial Services Bureau recently proposed that Option B 
above should be pursued-that statutory rescue should be "subject to the 
conditinn that the company undergoing rescue must clear the arrears of wages and 
other statutory entitlement of employees as if it is a going concern".29 In the view 
of the Financial Services Bureau, the advantages of this option are the follon.- 
Ing- 
employee's rights are fully protected in line with existing labour legis- 
lation; 
it does not involve the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund; 
it does not require any contribution from the tax-payers or increase in 
the [HK]$?50 Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund levy or business 
registration fec for the creation of a new fund; 
it would help remove opportunities for possible abuse of [the] Protection 
of Wages on Insolvency Fund or any new fund in the course of corporate 
rescue; 
the requirements under this option would bc an effective tool to screen 
out the non-viable companies which should not have been qualified for 
statutory corporate rescue in the first place.30 
The likely effect of implementing this recommendation will be to dramatically 
curtail the ability of many companies to resort to provisional supervision. In 
addition, this recommendation might well increase the likelihood that a major 
secured creditor holding a flo~ting charge will decide to appoint a reccivcr at an 
earlier stage. For, in those cases where the benefits payable to employees (if a 
company opts for provisional supervision) will exceed the amounts paynhle as 
priorities to employees in a receivership (under section 79 of the Companies 
Ordinance), a securcd crcclitor may well prefer pursuing receivership rather than 
pruvisional supervision. 
Super Priority Borrowing 
The success or failure of a provisional supervision will frequently depend on 
whether the company is able to borrow sufficient amounts of working capital to 
keep the company afloat. The Law Reform Commission therefore recommended 
that loans made to a company during provisional supervision should receive super 
priority over the debts of a l l  creditors that are subject to the moratorium, with the 
exception of debts secured by fixed charges." Super priority lending will enable 
"Letter of hltsr Julina Chan for Secretary for Financial Services to respondents on the 
Consultation Paper un Curporate Rescue, June 2. 1999. 
' O  rhrd 
" Report on Coporate Rrscue, paras 12.1 81 12.3, at 73. 
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companies to receive crucial funding during provisional supervision. Since the 
awarding of a super priority does pose risks for existing creditors, the Report on 
Corporirte Rescue proposes that existing creditors should have the right of 6rst 
refusal to decide pr~hetlier to provide super priority lending. Only upon the refusal 
of existing creditors would the provisional supervisor be able to approach other 
sources for b o r r o ~ i n g . ~ ~  
Avoidance Powers 
The Report on Corporate Resrue does not include a detailed discussion on the 
proper scope of a provisional supervisor's avoidance powers. It is undcrstood that 
the gazetted bill will not provide for the application of avoidance powers in 
provisional supervision. Rather, if the creditors decide that a provisional super- 
vision should be terminated in favour of liquidation, "the company shall be 
deemed to have bccn in a creditors' vo lu r~ t a r~  winding-up from the date of the 
appointment of the provisional suprrvisor"." This would enable a liquidator to 
use section 266 of the Companies Ordinance to attack transactions occurring 
before the commencement of provisional supervision. 
The Plan of Voluntary Arrarigement 
The supervisor is responsible for drafting the proposal for voluntary 
arrangement. The draft arrangement plan should be in the form "of a concise 
sratcmcnt of thc proposed voluntary arrangement which should be capable of 
heing understooti by an average creditor in a reasonably short time".'" Beyond 
that, the requirements for the plan contents have deliberately been left open- 
ended "entirely at the discretion of the provisional s~~e rv i so r " . ' ~  In the draft plan, 
the provisional supervisor might propose a variety of restructuring solutions lor 
the company including the following: 
(a) an cxtcnsion o f  time for paymen1 of debts, 
(b) a composition in satisfaction of its debts, 
(c) the compromise of any claims against the company, 
(d) the variation or the reordering of the rating for payment of its drhts or 
any class of its debts, 
(e) the conversion of its debts in whole or in part into shares or other 
securities to be issued by the company, or 
(f) any othcr scheme or arrangement in relation to the affairs of the 
company.'" 
"hid., para. 12.2, at 73. 
" hid., para. 14.11, a t  82. 
",bid., para. 14.4, at 80-81. 
"[hid., para. 14.3, a t  80. 
"llid., para. 3.6. at 26-27. 
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The provisional supervisor must call a meeting of creditors to consider 
the proposed plan. Kcforc the meeting, each creditor will recrive a summary of the 
main features of the plan of arrangement and have the opportunity to inspect the 
draft plan, the provisional supervisor's report, a projected cash flow statement, 
and a statement by the provisional supervisor relating to the voluntary arrange- 
ment. At  the meeting, creditors should be able to: 
(1) approve the draft arrangement plan with o r  without modifications, o r  
(2) adjourn the meeting t o  allriw the provisional supervisor to submit a 
modified arrangement plan, or 
(3) reject the plan and resolve that the company should be wound up and 
a liquidator appointed." 
The proposal will be voted upon by a single class of creditors, and for any 
resolution t o  pass it will he necessary t o  gain the assent of a majority in number 
and in excess of two-thirds in value of all creditors voting on the resolution either 
in person o r  by proxy. Where the creditors approve a voluntary arrangenlent plan, 
the provisional supervision will cease and the terms of the voluntary arrangement 
will take effect. The voluntary arrangement will be binding on the company and 
its members and all creditors w h o  were entitled to vote on the plan. 'l'hcse 
restrictions shall continue unless and until the company breaches any of its 
obligations under the arrangement. 
Although it is true that a single class is administratively simpler and less likely 
LO delay the rehabilitative process, it does have the potential to cause serious 
conflicts between different groups of creditors." It would be better to separate 
secured and unsccurcd creditors for the purpose of voting on the plan. In 
addition, there should he a "hest interest of creditors test" which ensures that 
objecting creditors in a class will receive not less than they would rcceive if the 
company were to be wound up." Lastly, there should also be a "cramdown" 
mechanism t o  ensure that a plan may bc approved over the objection of a class of 
creditors unfairly withholding its c o n ~ c n t . ' ~  Of course, such procedures must be 
easily administered to ensure that undue time and expense is not wastrd in 
enforcement. 
Conclusion 
I t  s e e m  t o  take an economic crisis to get governments to focus on the need to 
enact modern, efficient insolvency laws and procedures. I n  this regard, Hong 
Kong is no different from other jurisdictiorrs in the region. However, given rhc 
slow pace at which the new insolvency legislaticln is being enacted, it is unlikely 
" rbid., para. 15.10, a t  85. 
" S e e  Boorh, "Hong Kung corporate rescue proposals". n. 33. ahovs, at 253. 
"See 11 U.S.C.A. s.I129ja)(7), (1999). 
'' ibid., s.l129(b). 
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that the new lairs will play a niajor role in addressing the existing economic 
problems. 
In the area of insolvency reform, what Hong Kong needs the most is a 
mechanism for corporate restructuring. I t  is unfor tu~~a te  hat the enactment of 
such a scheme is taking so long. And even when provisional supervision does 
come into operation, the number of cases i r  likcly to  be low. It should be 
anticipated that, initially, directors of small- and medium-sized family-controlled 
companies will be hesitant about resorting to provisional supervision for fear of 
losing control of their companies; and directors of companics in general will be 
conccrned about the need to satisfy employees' claims before commencing the 
new procedure. It will be crucial to the long-term success of provisional 
supervision that there are some early successes among the companies that resort 
to the procedure. 
The  new bankruprcy law has quickly led t o  a skyrocketing number o t  filings by 
individual debtors who wish to benefit from the automatic discharge. However, 
greater ecnnornic benefits will result when individuals are able to rcsort to 
individual voluntary arrangements rather than t o  personal bankruprcy. This is 
unlikely to occur until business conditions improve. Thus, it will likely be several 
years until the full cilect of the new bankruptcy laws will be evident. 
Postscript 
Insolvency Statistics 
Thc number of bankruptcies continues t o  increase, although thc number of 
winding-ups appears to be leveling off: in the year from April 1, 1999 to March 
31, 2000, thcre were 3726 bankruptcy orders and 895 winding-up orders; and 
from April 1 to Dece~r~ber  31, 2000 there were 4381 bankruptcy orders and 673 
winding-up orders. T l ~ r  percentage of bankruptcy petitions filed by debtors 
remains high. From April 1, 1999 to December 31, 2000, roughly 70 per cent of 
all bankruprcy petitions wcrc filed Ly debtors. Surprisingly-, the banks I~avr  not 
been very receptive to the individual voluntary arrangement procedures, and 
through March 31, 2000, only scven approved indivirlual voluntary arlangements 
had been recorded on the register maintained by the Official Kece i~er .~ '  
H.K.A.B. Guidelines 
The Hong Kong h.lonerary Authority collaborated with the H.K.A.B. in for- 
mulating a slightly rcviscd and extended version of the Guidelines, which are now 
called the Hang Kong Approa~h 11, Corporate D$fic~lt ier.~~ 
" See Official Receiver's Website, n. 38, above. 
" 1I.K.M.A.. Qzcarrerly Rullezin, November 1999, 13. 
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Provisional Supervision 
The Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000 (the "Bill") was on January 7, 
2 0 0 0 . ~ ~  Serious objections were raised against the corporate rescuc provisions, 
leading to their deletion from the Bill. The remainder of the Bill was enacted as the 
Companics (Amendment) Ordinance 2000, and brought into operation on July 1, 
2000." The provisional supervision provisions in the Bill included two especially 
problematic areas that encountered criticism. First, the proposed procedures 
seriously interfered with the rights of secured creditors; the Bill failed to include 
a provision preventing a creditors' resolution from approving a proposal of 
voluntary arrangement that would impair the rights of securecl creditors without 
first gaining their consent. Secondly, the commencement criteria required that, 
before a provisional supervision could be initiated, the company had to either pay 
in full all pre-existing debts and liabilities owing to its employees or open a trust 
account containing sufficient funds t o  pay such amounts. As noted above, such a 
requirement would curtail many companies from utilising provisiondl super- 
p is ion."^ 
Now, in February 2001, it appears that a new bill will be gazetted in the currcnt 
Legislative Council session. If enacted, it will likely come into operation latcr in  
2001 o r  early in 2002. 
"See the Hong Kong Government Gazette, 1.egal Supplemcnt No. 3, C5 Uanuary 7, 
2000). 
" see the Hang Kong Goarmment Gazette, Legal Supplcmcnt No. 1, A1643 (June 24, 
2000) -.-. ,. 
" For further discusrion of these issues and other aspects 01 the Con~panies (Amendment) 
Bill 2000, see I'hilip Shart & Charles D. Booth, "Corpor~rr  Rescue: This Year, Next 
Year.. . ," Hong Kong Ialuyer 50 (June 2000). 
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